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Abstract 
Individuals’ use of safeguards against information security risks is commonly conceptualized as 
the result of a risk-benefit analysis.  This economic perspective assumes a “rational actor” 
whereas risk is subjectively perceived by people who may be influenced by a number of social, 
psychological, cultural, and other “soft” factors.  Their decisions thus may deviate from what 
economic risk assessment analysis would dictate.  In this respect, a phenomenon interesting to 
study is that on social network sites (SNSes) people tend to, despite a number of potential security 
risks, provide an amount of personal information that they would otherwise frown upon.  In this 
study we explore how people’s affect toward online social networking may impact their use of 
privacy safeguards.  Since building social capital is a main purpose of online social networking, 
we use social capital theory to examine some potential contextual influence on the formation of 
the affect.  More specifically, we adopt the perspective proposed by Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998), 
which views social capital as a composite of structural, relational, and cognitive capitals.  
Preliminary analysis of 271 survey responses shows that (a) a person’s structural and relational 
embeddedness in her online social networks, as well as her cognitive ability in maintaining those 
networks, are positively related to her affect toward SNSes; (b) a person’s affect toward SNSes 
moderates the relationship between her perception of privacy risk and the privacy safeguards she 
implements on the SNSes. 
Keywords:  Information security, security safeguards, privacy, social network sites, social capital, 
affect, risk assessment 
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Introduction 
Use of online technologies exposes users to a host of security threats (Lu, Hsu, and Hsu, 2005).  Sensing these 
threats, a user may choose not to participate in online activities (Cho, 2004; Lu et al, 2005), adopt threat avoidance 
mechanisms (Liang and Xue, 2009), or deal with the aftermath (Liang and Xue, 2009; Son and Kim, 2008).  To 
date, most of the literature on information security risk-related behaviors aims at organizational settings.  The few 
studies on individual risk mitigation actions (e.g., Chellappa and Sin, 2005; Dinev, Bellotto, Hart, Russo, Serra, and 
Colautti, 2006; Dinev and Hart, 2006; Liang and Xue, 2009) appear to be an extension of the organizational 
assessment process to the individual level.  As a result, individual safeguarding action is theorized as the result of an 
assessment process believed to be a rational cost-benefit analysis.  We argue that the underlying “rational person” 
assumption is too simplistic for analyzing people’s risk assessment and mitigation. 
Cost-benefit analysis is a cognitive strategy that individuals adopt, consciously or subconsciously, when evaluating 
information security risks.  Nevertheless, the individual risk assessment process cannot be fully understood without 
exploring the roles played by people’s affective feelings toward technology and the context of technology use.  
Following the studies conducted by Slovic and colleagues (Alhakami and Slovic, 1994; Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, 
and Johnson, 2000; Slovic, 2000; Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein, 1977) on how affect influences risk-related 
judgments and decisions, we propose that a person’s affect toward a particular online technology can impact her 
adoption of security safeguards.  Furthermore, such affect is not formed based on the technology per se.  Rather, it is 
a function of the context in which the user uses the online technology.   
To test these relationships, we select social network sites (SNSes) as the focal online technology to study.  This is 
because of two reasons.  First, having emerged only during the past few years but enjoying phenomenal growth, 
SNSes attract numerous security attacks due to the nature and amount of personal information users provide on these 
sites.  Second, SNSes are closely related to a person’s emotions and feelings (Ellison, Steinfield, and Lampe, 2007; 
Helliwell and Putnam, 2004).  Thus, it can be expected that people form strong affective feelings toward the SNSes, 
which in turn influence the user’s use of privacy safeguards.  Also, since the main reason people use SNSes is to 
maintain, develop, and enhance their social capital (Martinez Aleman and Wartman, 2009), we apply findings from 
social capital research to study the influence of contextual factors on affect.  We integrate these into a nomological 
network (Figure 1) about the affect dimension of SNS users’ use of privacy safeguards to fend off perceived risks.   
Social Network Sites and Related Risks 
It is evident that SNSes have achieved cultural relevance worldwide (Martinez Aleman and Wartman, 2009).  The 
past few years have seen dazzling growth in SNSes.  For example, Facebook enjoys 50 billion page views per 
month.    Through November of 2008, some social networking sites have experienced usage growth rates of 100% or 
more per year as measured by unique visitors (Schonfeld, 2007, 2008).  However, while people flock to the various 
SNSes, it remains to be seen how many of them are taking heed of the plethora of security threats around online 
social networking.  Most alarmingly, the wealth of personal information people supply on their SNS profiles is a 
hotbed for privacy-related attacks.  For instance, SNS profiles can be hacked and “owned” by using a combination 
of coordinated exploits.  By collecting and mining a person’s data, an attacker is able to create a digital dossier that 
can be used against that person.  The aggregated data also may be used to serve the ends of spammers and malware 
and spyware writers.  Cyber and physical stalkers may use online personal data to keep track of their targets.  
Similarly, unscrupulous use of profile data may enhance the “credibility” of so call “social-engineers,” who find 
their ways into corporate systems and networks by impersonating other people.  Other privacy-related threats 
include damage to reputation due to surreptitious creation or use of profiles and images for other people; the 
increasingly popular practice among employers to “pre-screen” job applicants by examining their profiles; loss of 
control over one’s own data to the SNS provider, etc. (ENISA, 2007; Jones, 2008; Maloncy, 2008; Mansfield-
Devine, 2008; Martinez Aleman and Wartman, 2009; Whitaker, Evans, and Voth, 2009). 
Unfortunately, due to the fast growth and a business model based on the number of users attracted, security and 
privacy have not been the first priority for SNS providers (ENISA, 2007).  Therefore, one of the most serious risks 
to SNS users is loss of privacy.  Whether done consciously or subconsciously, an SNS user forms a perception of the 
potential risk of compromised privacy.  Based on Dinev and Hart (2006) and Son and Kim (2008), we define 
perceived privacy risk as the degree to which an individual believes that the personal information she provides 
online may be used improperly. 
 Wu et. al. / Affect and Social Network Sites Security 
  
 Thirtieth International Conference on Information Systems, Phoenix 2009 3 
Out of concern for the perceived threats to her privacy, the user can take actions as privacy safeguards against the 
potential risks involved in their use of SNSes.  These actions include: (a) thoroughly reading the privacy policy of 
the SNS; (b) managing personally identifiable information diligently; (c) changing the default privacy settings of the 
SNS; and (d) exercising caution before downloading and using SNS applications (ENISA, 2007; Martinez Aleman 
and Wartman, 2009).   
 
 
Figure 1.  Research Model  
Social Capital Theory 
“Social capital is the goodwill available to individuals or groups.  Its source lies in the structure and content of the 
actor’s social relations.  Its effects flow from the information, influence, and solidarity it makes available to the actor 
(Adler and Kwon, 2002, p. 23).”  Generally, social capital is manifested as a positive outcome of relationships 
within a social network (Helliwell and Putnam, 2004).  Social capital theory has gained a lot of exposure in a wide 
range of social science disciplines in recent years (Adler and Kwon, 2002).  In information systems (IS) studies, its 
widest application is to explain the motivation for participation in knowledge sharing activities in which social 
capital is found to motivate people to share information and knowledge in the absence of direct, utilitarian rewards 
(e.g., Robert, Dennis, and Ahuja, 2008; Wasko and Faraj, 2005). Most business researchers examine social capital 
from a perspective developed by Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) that sees social capital as the composite of structural, 
relational, and cognitive components.  We use this nomenclature to analyze people’s use of SNSes. 
Structural Capital 
Also termed “structural embeddedness” (Lawson, Tyler, and Cousins, 2008), structural capital indicates the 
connections between individuals, i.e., the structural links created through the social interactions between individuals 
in a network (Wasko and Faraj, 2005).  Wasko and Faraj (2005) gauge structural capital via an individual’s degree 
of network centrality.  Robert, Dennis, and Ahuja (2008) view it as a function of network intensity and 
decentralization.  Lawson et al (2008) describe it through the density of network relationships, diversity of points of 
contact, and frequency of communications.  Despite their different perspectives, researchers tend to agree that 
structural capital is manifested through some technical/tactical characteristics of a person’s connection links.  Thus, 
in the context of SNS use, we define structural capital as a person’s structural embeddedness in her SNS-facilitated 
social network.  It can be reflected by some characteristics of her communication links: (a) density – the number of 
links with other individuals; (b) intensity – the number of exchanges taking place over those links at a given time; 
(c) diversity – degree of heterogeneity of the individuals a person connects to; (d) centrality – degree to which the 
person dominates exchanges; (e) frequency – how often the person utilizes her connections, etc. 
Relational Capital 
Relational capital stands for the congenial nature of the relationships in a collective.  It exists when members have a 
strong identification with the collective, trust others in the collective, perceive an obligation to participate, and abide 
by its norms (Wasko and Faraj, 2005).  Relational capital is indicative of the nature and quality of the relationships 
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among people and how those relationships affect behavior (Robert et al, 2008).  Common qualities observed include 
mutual trust, respect, and friendship (Kale, Singh, and Perlmutter, 2000).  Consistent with these studies, we define 
relational capital as a person’s perception of belonging to an amiable SNS-facilitated social network in which other 
members will reciprocate the person’s benevolence.  It can be reflected by the person’s perception of the members in 
her social network: (a) degree to which person identifies herself with the network; (b) degree of commitment; (c) 
amiability; (d) trustworthiness of members; (e) reciprocity of behaviors among members, etc. 
Cognitive Capital 
Proper functioning of social networks and accumulation of social capital require some degree of shared 
understanding of the language and context (Wasko and Faraj, 2005).  Ideally, a person should be able to navigate her 
network and tap the resources available through the network efficiently and effectively.  This is more likely to occur 
when shared understanding exists among the members, because it reduces the amount of translation and learning 
needed.  Cognitive capital is the part of social capital where such shared understanding is embedded.  Researchers 
view cognitive capital as shared goals and culture (Krause, Handfield, and Tyler, 2007), shared understanding 
(Robert et al, 2008), shared code or paradigm that facilitates a common understanding (Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998), etc.  
Wasko and Faraj (2005) take another angle and suggest that cognitive capital is cultivated by (a) expertise and (b) 
length of participation, both of which also enhance a person’s ability to navigate the network and utilize social 
capital.  We define cognitive capital as a person’s ease in understanding her SNS-facilitated social network as a 
result of interacting, over time, with network members sharing common goals, culture, and language.  It can be 
reflected by the person’s perception of the degree to which she and other members share (a) goals for using the 
network, (b) thought processes, (c) language used on the network; (d) her expertise and length in participation, etc. 
Influence of Affect on Risk-Related Behaviors 
At present, there appears to be a dearth of IS studies on how a person assesses security risks and takes risk-avoding 
actions (Liang and Xue, 2009).  The exception is some in-depth, rigorous studies focusing on privacy concerns 
about providing personal information on websites (Chellappa and Sin, 2005; Dinev et al, 2006; Dinev and Hart, 
2006; Son and Kim, 2008). The extant literature, moreover, usually assumes that an individual rationally weighs the 
benefits and potential losses due to online exposure and, based on this cost-benefit analysis, determines a course of 
action accordingly. 
Dinev and Hart (2006) study the effect of conflicting considerations on people’s willingness to provide personal 
information to transact on the Internet.  They categorize loss-related considerations as “risk beliefs” and benefit-
related considerations as “confidence and enticement beliefs.”  Both types of beliefs are then weighed against each 
other through a decision process that Dinev and Hart term “privacy calculus,” whose roots they trace to Culnan and 
Armstrong (1999).  The result of the calculus is information-giving behavior that maximizes positive outcomes and 
minimizes negative outcomes.  Chellappa and Sin (2005) study a similar online behavior – individuals’ use of 
personalization services provided by many websites.  Their model is more parsimonious but underscored by the 
same cost-benefit analysis approach. 
Most recently, Liang and Xue (2009) broach the technology threat avoidance theory (TTAT).  They suggest that a 
person’s threat avoidance behavior is essentially the result of two appraisal processes.  Threat appraisal determines 
the person’s threat perception by evaluating her susceptibility to and severity of the threat.  Coping appraisal gauges 
the avoidability of the threat by taking into account perceived effectiveness of protective mechanisms, perceived 
costs of implementing them, and the person’s self-efficacy in using the mechanisms.  These appraisals influence the 
person’s coping-related motivation and behavior.  Although Liang and Xue do not have a clear tone of costs vis-á-
vis benefits comparison, their proposal is true to the cost-benefit analysis roots in its probabilistic approach to 
assessment. 
The basic steps in a cost-benefit analysis are (a) the arrival at the expected value of loss by summing up the 
(cost*probability) terms across all adverse alternatives; (b) the calculation of expected benefits; and (c) the 
comparison of the two (Fischhoff, 1977; Fischhoff, Lichtenstein, Slovic, Derby, and Keeney, 1981).  This paradigm 
is echoed in business research (e.g., Culnan and Bies, 2003; Stone and Stone, 1990).  The fundamental assumption 
of cost-benefit analysis is that people will faithfully follow what economic analysis dictates.  In other words, they’re 
“rational” (Fischhoff et al, 1981; Shostack and Stewart, 2008).  However, evidence abounds that the basic cost-
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benefit model is not an accurate description of how people make decisions in actual practice (Fischhoff, 1977).  In 
fact, one motivation for the Dinev and Hart (2006) study is the observation that sales over the Internet continue to 
increase despite people’s privacy concerns.  In general, economic Security models often break down when the user 
violates assumptions such as economic rationality (Shostack and Stewart, 2008). 
One reason for such violation of the rational-person assumption is people’s affect.  Their affective feelings toward 
events or objects related to a risk often influence their risk-related behaviors.  We posit that affect can have two 
types of effects in information security setting.  First, affect can skew a person’s judgment of the consequences of 
potential risk, thus reducing her willingness to take safeguards against the risks.  Finucane et al (2000) find that 
affect is an essential component and serves as a cue in many forms of risk-related decision making.  People often use 
an “affect heuristic” instead of weighing the pros and cons or retrieving from memory many relevant examples.  
Application of affect heuristic can thwart the use of cost-benefit analysis because, interestingly, under the influence 
of affect, favorable outcomes often are blown out of proportion, leading the person to take riskier course of action.  
Second, even when the perceived risk is held constant, a person’s affect can lead to different level of risk-
taking/aversion.  Although research on this effect is mixed (Deldin and Levin, 1986; Isen, Nygren, and Ashby, 1988; 
Isen and Patrick, 1983), it is certain that a person’s risk-mitigation action is not a simple, linear function of the 
amount of risk she perceives.  Therefore, the security safeguards a person implements depends not only the 
perceived security threats but also her affect toward the technology in use.   
In the realm of information security, practitioner observations seem to confirm the judgment-clouding effect of 
affect.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that emotions, feelings, and subjective perception often are what people rely on 
when they choose security technologies (Schneier, 2008).  Unfortunately, there is a lack of academic research on 
this.  Therefore, theorizing and empirical testing of the role of affect in information security risk-related behaviors is 
warranted. 
Research Hypotheses 
Only a few studies have investigated the dimensions of social capital as independent variables at the individual level 
(Yang, Lee, and Karnia, 2009) and none that we are aware has done so in a SNS context.  Therefore, while our 
hypotheses are logical, they are exploratory in nature.  
 
First we argue that if a person is strongly embedded in her SNS-facilitated social networks, it is expected that she 
becomes more inter-connected with other members in the network and has more resources to utilize.  The individual 
is more likely to form a positive feeling about the SNS.  Therefore, 
 
H1: A person’s structural capital is positively related to her affect toward the SNSes.1 
The more relational capital a person accumulates via using SNSes, the more friendship she feels from a group of 
trustworthy and amiable people she identifies herself with.  It is more likely that she entertains a positive emotion 
toward the SNSes.  Therefore, 
H2: A personal’s relational capital is positively related to her affect toward SNSes.  
The more cognitive capital a person has, the more likely that she and other members in her social networks share 
common goals, mental model, and language.  Also, she is more at home with working with the SNSes to manage her 
social network.  It is more likely for her to come to like the SNS.  Therefore, 
H3: A person’s cognitive capital is positively related to her affect toward SNSes. 
When a person perceives threats to her privacy posted by her use of SNSes, she is prone to taking actions to prevent 
the threats from materializing.  Therefore, 
H4: A person’s perceived privacy risk is positively related to privacy safeguards she implements on SNSes. 
As discussed above, affect can cause an individual to downplay the negative effect of risks.  In the SNS context, the 
degree to which an individual implements privacy safeguards also is a function of her affective feeling toward the 
SNS.  For a given level of perceived risk, higher level of affect reduces the influence of perceived risk on the 
                                                          
1
 Consistent with Compeau and Higgins (1999), we use the term “affect” to refer to positive feelings toward a technology. 
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safeguard adopted.  Put differently, the relationship between perceived risk and safeguards depends on the level of 
affect.  Therefore, 
H5: A person’s affect toward SNSes moderates the relationship between her perceived privacy risk and the privacy 
safeguards she implements on SNSes. 
Methodology 
Survey Development 
We created a survey instrument to test our hypotheses. Wherever possible, we used scales adapted or taken from 
prior studies, carefully making necessary changes in wording to fit the context of SNSes.  Structural capital was 
measured by five items that are based on Robert et al (2008) and Lawson et al (2008).  Relational capital was 
measured by five items, based on Robert et al (2008), Wasko and Faraj (2005), and Kale et al (2000).  Cognitive 
capital was measured by five items based on Wasko and Faraj (2005), Tsai and Ghoshal (1998), and Krause et al 
(2007).  To measure affect toward SNSes, we adapted five items from Compeau and Higgins (1995; 1999) and 
Thompson, Higgins, and Howell (1991).  Four items were adapted from Dinev and Hart (2006) to measure 
perceived privacy risk.  To measure privacy safeguards, we developed five items based on ENISA (2007) and 
Martinez Aleman and Wartman (2009).  All items were measured using five-point Likert scale. 
The initial instrument was piloted by four IS researchers not involved with the project, who provided written and 
oral feedback. The piloting process tested the appearance of the survey, the clarity of questions and instructions, and 
the completeness of the survey. Based upon suggestions, additional demographic questions were added. 
Survey Administration and Respondent Demographics 
Undergraduate students in multiple sections of a core business course at a large public university in the U.S. were 
asked to complete the survey.  We attempted to minimize the threat of social desirability/common method by stating 
at there were “no correct answers.”  In addition, each potential respondent was informed that all individual responses 
would be kept anonymous and that only aggregate data would be presented in the results. 
A priori power analysis using G*Power 3 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, and Buchner, 2007) showed that 119 responses 
were needed to achieve .95 power in detecting medium size effect, which was set at .15 as suggested by Cohen 
(1988).  We collected 310 survey responses.  Out of the 310 respondents, 22 stated that they did not use SNSes at 
all.  Another 17 respondents answered 1s, 3s, or 5s to all of the questions, a sign of invalid answers.  After excluding 
these irrelevant or invalid responses, we had 271 usable responses, exceeding the required sample size as indicated 
by the a priori power analysis. 
The mean of the respondent age is 22.3.  Of them 53.20% are male and 46.80% female.  Those who are employed 
full-time make up 20.7% of the sample; employed part-time, 51.3%; and unemployed, 26.6%.  8.6% consider 
themselves “expert” users of SNSes; 64.6% “intermediate” users; and 25.1% “novice” users.  On average, the 
respondents spend 1.138 hours per day on SNSes, which are the result of3.15 log-ins to the sites per day.  Put 
differently, the average respondent spends about 21.68 minutes each time they log in to an SNS. 
Preliminary Analysis 
First, we conducted a principal component analysis (PCA).  After examining items with unsatisfactory loadings, for 
each construct, we retained three items with the highest loadings.  Retained items showed satisfactory loadings in 
the second run of PCA.   
The retained items are – Structural Capital: (1) I have a lot of "friends" on my SNS. (2) I have a lot of exchanges 
with my “friends” on my SNS. (3) I use my SNS very frequently. Relational Capital: (1) I have a strong sense of 
belonging to my SNS. (2) I feel a great deal of loyalty to my SNS. (3) I feel a great deal of friendship on my SNS. 
Cognitive Capital: (1) My "friends" on my SNS and I share the same goals for using my SNS. (2) My "friends" on 
my SNS and I and I think alike. (3) My "friends" on my SNS and I use the same type of expressions. Affect toward 
SNSes: (1) I like using my SNS. (2) Using my SNS is fun. (3) Interacting with my friends has become more 
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interesting since I joined my SNS. Perceived Privacy Risk: (1) I am concerned about putting information and 
pictures on my SNS profile because of what others might do with it. (2) I am concerned about putting information 
and pictures on my SNS profile because it could be used in a way I did not foresee. (3) I am concerned that my 
private information that I put on my SNS might show up elsewhere on the Internet.  Privacy Safeguards: (1) I 
diligently manage personally identifiable information related to my pictures on my SNS. (2) I looked into the default 
privacy settings on my SNS and adjusted them to fit my preferences.  (3) I am very careful about downloading and 
using web applications (e.g., "widgets on Facebook") in my SNS. 
We then performed partial least square (PLS) analyses on the retained items.  PLS was used because it is proper for 
theory building and exploratory studies (Gefen, Straub, and Boudreau, 2000). 
Assessment of the Measurement Model 
The adequacy of the measurement model is determined by examining reliability and convergent and discriminant 
validities (Hulland, 1999).  The reliability of all the constructs falls within the range from .8290 to .9311, greater 
than the generally accepted threshold of .70 (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, and Tatham, 2006).  Convergent validity 
provides a measure of the variance shared between a construct and its indicators.  It is gauged by examining whether 
items load with significant t-values on its construct and the significance level of .05 or higher is desired (Gefen and 
Straub, 2005).  Significance level of .01 is observed of the loadings of all of our items.  Convergent validity also is 
demonstrated by the square root of the average variance extracted (AVE) higher than .50. (Fornell and Larcker, 
1981).  In our study, the square roots of AVEs are between .7860 and .9047.  There are two procedures for assessing 
discriminant validity.  First, the squared roots of the AVEs should be higher than all of the correlations between any 
two constructors (i.e., the off-diagonal correlations) (Chin, 1998; Gefen and Straub, 2005).  The AVE squared-roots 
reported above also are higher than all inter-construct correlations.  Second, each within-construct item must load 
highly on the construct it is intended to measure and cross-loadings need to be lower than the within-construct item 
loadings.  In our study, this is observed in the loadings tables.  In summary, our measurement model appears to be 
valid, in terms of reliability and convergent and discriminant validity. 
Assessing the Structural Model 
Since we hypothesized moderation effect in our model, we used hierarchical regression to test our structural model 
(Cohen, Cohen, West, and Aiken, 2003; Keith, 2006).  The first regression was run without the moderation effect.  
In the second regression, we included the moderation effect by creating an interaction term between the moderator 
(affect) and the predictor latent variable whose effect is moderated, i.e., perceived privacy risk.  As proposed by 
Chin, Marcolin, and Newsted (2003), an interaction term was created by multiplying the indicators for those latent 
variables.  This newly created latent variable was then added as a predictor of the criterion variable (privacy 
safeguards).  The following table shows the preliminary analysis results: 
Table 1. Structural Model Analysis Results 
Step 1 Structural capital (SC) 
Relational capital (RC) 
Cognitive capital (CC) 
Affect toward SNSes (AF) 
Perceived privacy risk (PR) 
Privacy safeguards (PS) 
R2: 
AF .616  
PS .293 
SC → AF 0.427*** 
RC → AF 0.287*** 
CC → AF 0.242*** 
AF → PS 0.447*** 
PR → PS 0.215*** 
Step 2 SC, RC, CC, AF, PR, PS† 
AFxPR 
R2: 
AF .636 
PS .308 (∆R2 =.015) 
AFxPR → PS -0.126* 
AF → PS 0.421*** 
PR → PS 0.213*** 
Notes: *** p <.001, ** p <.01, * p <.05  †All coefficients are significant (p < .001) and similar in magnitude to those 
in Step 1.  Only two are listed because they are used in the equation for moderation effect (see next page). 
 
As indicated by the results from the first regression, the model without moderation effect explains 61.6% of the 
variance in affect toward SNSes and 29.3% of the variance in privacy safeguards.  All three components of social 
capital – structural, relational, and cognitive capital – are found to be significantly and positively related to affect 
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toward SNSes, lending support to H1, H2, and H3.  H4, which suggests that a person is more likely to adopt privacy 
safeguards if she perceives higher risk, is supported.  The second regression shows that by including the moderation 
effect of AF on PR → PS, the complete model explains an additional 1.5% of the variance in privacy safeguards.  
Using the method described in Mathieson, Peacock and Chin (2001), the effect size f2 for PS is calculated as (R2Step2 
– R2Step1)/(1-R2Step2) = .015/.692 = .0217.  The pseudo F(4, 266) = f2*(n – k -1) = .0217(266) = 5.7722.  Therefore, 
the additional 1.5% additional variance explained by the complete model is significant at the .001 level.  
When the moderation effect is significant, the regression equation can be algebraically rearranged so that either 
variable can be said to moderate the relationship between the other variable and the criterion variable.  To resolve 
this equivocality, it is recommended that researchers pre-designate one of the two variables as the moderator on 
theoretical grounds (Sharma, Durand, and Gur-Arie, 1981).  Following this guideline and based on our literature 
review, we hypothesized AF as the moderator.  Also, with the presence of significant moderation effect, the 
moderated relationship is no longer “main effect” but “conditional effect” instead (Aiken and West, 1991; Jaccard 
and Turrisi, 2003), i.e., its slope is different for each feasible value of the moderator.  For this reason, although the 
regression coefficient of AF is significant, it would be meaningless to interpret it because we have hypothesized, a 
priori, that it is the cause of the conditional effect that PR has on PS.  Therefore, AF should not also have 
“conditional effect” on PS.  The coefficient, however, is part of the equation showing the conditional effect: PS = 
(.213 - .126*AF)*PR + .421*AF.  As can be seen from the equation, the slope of regressing PS on PR depends on 
the magnitude of AF.  Following Aiken and West (1991) and Cohen, Cohen, West, and Aiken (2003), we plotted the 
regression lines at three values of AF: mean, mean + 1 SD, and mean - 1 SD (Figure 2).  Clearly, when the level of 
AF is higher, for the same level of perceived risk, an individual is not as likely to adopt safeguards, and vice versa.  
Therefore, H5 is supported. 
 
Figure 2.  Moderation Effect of Affect 
 
Potential Contribution and Conclusion 
Our research findings will contribute to an under-studied area in IS research – individual risk assessment and actions 
related to online activities.  In the setting of social network sites, our preliminary findings show that affect toward 
the sites could lessen people’s use of security safeguards.  Holding the risks involved constant, the stronger their 
affective feelings toward the technology, the less likely people will implement safeguards to protect themselves 
against the risks.   
Our study also will contribute to the social capital literature.  Currently, IS researchers primarily use social capital to 
explain knowledge sharing.  We extend the application of social capital in IS by connecting it with a construct in the 
area of technology adoption – affect.  Also, our analysis validates the applicability of the three-component view of 
social capital.  The parsimonious measurement scales we developed and validated can be easily adapted by future IS 
researchers in their social capital-related research. In addition, heretofore, scant social capital research has been 
conducted in virtual environments; our research responds to a call from Yang, Lee, and Karnia (2009) to explore 
social capital in such a context.   
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